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Abstract Coopetition (simultaneous cooperation and
competition) between organizations has emerged as a
prominent and critical industrial practice that allows
organizations to increase combined welfare through coop-
eration while maximizing individual gains through com-
petition. The formulation and enactment of such an
organizational strategy entails designing and operating
information systems that maximize benefits while mini-
mizing costs from concomitant cooperation and competi-
tion. Coopetition raises new concerns and considerations
about the design of data, processes, and interfaces of
information systems. Analyzing coopetition can be chal-
lenging since cooperation and competition are paradoxical
social behaviors that are undergirded by contradictory
logics, hypotheses, and assumptions. Therefore, the ability
of decision-makers to represent and reason about coopeti-
tion in a structured and systematic manner can be beneficial
as it can support their efforts to co-design organizational
strategies and information systems. This paper presents
insights about the initial stages of an exploratory research
project that is focused on the development of a modeling
framework to support representation and reasoning of
interorganizational coopetitive strategies. The objectives of
this paper are to outline the goals of this research project
which include: (1) identifying the primary characteristics
for modeling and analyzing coopetitive relationships, as
well as (2) proposing artefacts for expressing and evalu-
ating these relationships.
Keywords Coopetition  Information system design 
Enterprise modeling  Strategic analysis  Literature review
1 Introduction
Coopetition, which refers to simultaneous cooperation and
competition, serves as ‘‘an important domain for industrial
practice’’ (Bouncken et al. 2015). Sun and Xu (2005) assert
that it characterizes ‘‘the current trend of economic activ-
ities’’. It has become ‘‘increasingly popular in recent years’’
(Gnyawali and Park 2009) and is ‘‘an integral part of many
companies’ daily agenda’’ (Bengtsson and Kock 2014). It
refers to a phenomenon in which two or more enterprises
cooperate and compete with each other simultaneously
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). For example, coope-
tition is common in the software industry where vendors
compete to sell products and services while cooperating in
standards bodies, open source communities, and trade
associations. Coopetition is also common within enter-
prises, such as multinational corporations, where local
divisions cooperate to achieve objectives of their parent
corporation while competing for resources that are offered
by that corporate parent.
A multi-level example of coopetition is found in the
transportation industry and concerns the relationships
between airlines and their networks. Chiambaretto and
Dumez (2016) note that simultaneous cooperation and
competition takes place directly between airlines as well as
indirectly through the alliances of which they are members.
Accepted after two revisions by the editors of the special issue.
V. Pant (&)  E. Yu
Faculty of Information, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
e-mail: vik.pant@mail.utoronto.ca
E. Yu
e-mail: eric.yu@utoronto.ca
E. Yu
Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto,
Toronto, Canada
123
Bus Inf Syst Eng 60(1):39–54 (2018)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12599-017-0514-0
For example, many airlines compete to sell tickets on
common routes to passengers but cooperate by sharing
their airport facilities such as common check-in counters
and lounges for passengers. Similarly, many airlines
cooperate through interlining agreements whereby each
partner airline advertises the routes and destinations of its
partners as its own. However, some of these airlines also
compete since they are members of different alliances (e.g.,
Star Aliance, SkyTeam, and One World) that offer com-
peting loyalty programs.
Coopetition is a relevant topic of study in the informa-
tion system (IS) engineering domain because researchers
have ‘‘underscored the impact of corporate strategy on IT
design’’ (Duh et al. 2006). Specifically, coopetition is rel-
evant for information systems (IS) engineering because it
imposes specific design considerations for systems that are
used by partners who are also competitors. For example,
adoption of coopetition as a strategy is likely to impact IS
decisions about transaction processing, data sharing, com-
pliance monitoring, and process integration within
coopeting organizations.
The rest of the paper presents insights from the initial
stages of an exploratory research project that is focused on
the development of a modeling framework for analyzing
interorganizational coopetition. This research project will
adopt Design Science Research (DSR) as it offers an
appropriate paradigm for studying socio-technical phe-
nomena (Hevner et al. 2008; Peffers et al. 2007). DSR
focuses on constructs, models, methods, and instantiations
to portray and ponder IS in their environments. In this
research project, DSR will be complemented by case
studies because they accommodate the consideration of
human interpretations (Walsham 1995) of socio-technical
phenomena. This paper shares artefacts that were devel-
oped in the preliminary stages of this research project on
the modeling of interorganizational coopetition.
In Sect. 2, we briefly give an outline of scholarly liter-
ature on the alignment of IS/IT strategy with organizational
strategy. This discussion situates enterprise modeling (EM)
research into coopetition within the IS engineering domain.
In this section, we also present a synopsis about the evo-
lution of coopetition theory within strategic management
(SM) literature. In Sect. 3, we present generic and abstract
models of inter-organizational competition arising from
resource contentions. In Sect. 4, we enumerate the
requirements for modeling inter-organizational coopetition
with reference to intuitions from SM literature. In Sect. 5,
we use modeling to depict the presence of inter-organiza-
tional coopetition as manifested in the phenomenon of
inter-partner learning and knowledge sharing. In Sect. 6,
we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the modeling
language that we adopt for expressing interorganizational
coopetition in this paper. In Sect. 7, we review related
work and in Sect. 8 we explain our conclusions as well as
propose next steps for this research project.
2 Background
Several researchers have noted the need for aligning
information systems (IS) with organizational strategy.
Pijpers et al. (2008) note that ‘‘although ‘business strategy’
and ‘Information Systems’ (IS) seem to be quite distant
topics, their relationship has been of interest for both the
academic and business world.’’ This is partially because
‘‘research shows that alignment of IT with business strat-
egy leads to superior business performance’’ (Bleistein
et al. 2004). Carvallo and Franch (2012) point out that
‘‘deep understanding of the enterprise context and strate-
gies’’ are required while designing information systems
because ‘‘software applications need to be well aligned
with business strategies of organizations’’ (Aurum and
Wohlin 2005). Giannoulis et al. (2011a) claim that ‘‘en-
suring that IT systems are defined and designed in accor-
dance to business strategy’’ can help enterprises ‘‘to solve
the always-present problem of business-IT alignment’’.
Due to these reasons, many IS researchers have incor-
porated concepts from business strategy into frameworks
for designing IS. These researchers have proposed visual
and conceptual modeling techniques that are purpose-built
for representing organizational strategies. Carvallo and
Franch (2012) apply key concepts from Porter’s (1979)
Five Forces Model to offer a modeling technique for
depicting interorganizational competition. Giannoulis et al.
(2011a) incorporate main ideas from Porter’s (1985) con-
ception of Value Chain into models of information sys-
tems. Pijpers et al. (2008) present a modeling technique for
expressing the interconnected business strategies of various
actors in economic constellations.
Giannoulis et al. (2011b) proffer a modeling technique
for articulating balanced scorecard and strategy maps.
Samavi et al. (2008) tender a modeling technique for
portraying Christensen’s (2006) Disruptive Innovation
approach. Giannoulis and Zdravkovic (2012) introduce a
modeling technique for describing Kim and Mauborgne’s
(2005) Blue Ocean Strategy. Such modeling techniques
enable IS designers to reflect their organizations’ strategies
in IS requirements. This information can be used to analyze
the sufficiency of IS for supporting organizational strate-
gies. Many of these techniques extend extant modeling
languages, such as i* and e3value, by adding entities and
relationships that pertain to strategic management (SM)
concepts.
The methodical study of interorganizational relation-
ships emerged within the field of SM in the mid-1900s
(Ghemawat 2002). SM is concerned with the ‘‘creation,
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success, and survival’’ of organizations as well as ‘‘un-
derstanding their failure, its costs, and its lessons’’ (Rumelt
et al. 1991). It is a domain of practice that became a field of
scholarly inquiry after World War II (Ghemawat 2002).
Several economists were central to its inception and
influenced its development as a field of study that was
related to but separate from economics (Rumelt et al.
1991).
Over time, as SM matured and became established as a
prominent field of research it benefited from the insights of
sociologists (Pettigrew et al. 2002). Thus, while SM
assumed its own intellectual identity it was shaped by ideas
from economics and sociology. One example of the com-
monality between these three domains can be found in their
respective foci wherein each of these disciplines study
objects in their contexts – i.e., economists study firms in
markets, sociologists study individuals in populations, and
SM researchers study organizations in environments.
Throughout the 1980s, competitive and cooperative
schools of thought came to dominate SM discourses on
interorganizational relationships (Dagnino and Padula
2002). The competitive view argued that firms succeeded
by sustaining competitive advantages over their rivals.
These enduring differential benefits allowed firms that
possessed them to outperform other firms in the markets
for factor inputs as well as finished outputs. By contrast,
the cooperative view asserted that firms succeeded
because of their ‘‘relational rents’’ (Dyer and Singh 1998).
These were benefits that accrued to an organization from
its partnership-specific idiosyncratic portfolio of
capabilities.
By the mid-1990s these dichotonic explanations of
interorganizational relationships had become firmly
entrenched within the research literature on SM. Contrary
to incongruity, observations from the industry indicated
that firms adopted a ‘‘both/and’’ approach to competition
and cooperation rather than an ‘‘either/or’’ approach (Raza-
Ullah et al. 2014). This meant that purely competitive or
solely cooperative explanations of interorganizational
relationships were incomplete at best and incorrect at
worst.
It was during this time that two game theorists proposed
an esemplastic theory (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996)
for harmonizing these antipodal perspectives. Their syn-
cretistic approach prescribed organizations to ‘‘cooperate
to grow the pie and compete to split it up’’ (Brandenburger
and Nalebuff 1995). It was related to game theory research
in the areas of biform games (Brandenburger and Stuart
2007) and value based business strategies (Brandenburger
and Stuart 1996). Coopetition encouraged organizations to
cooperate for achieving joint objectives while competing to
maximize their individual gains (Nalebuff and Branden-
burger 1997).
Coopetition research has experienced a surge in
prominence in the two decades since its introduction. A
number of literature reviews1 as well as special editions of
scholarly journals2 have noted the proliferation of aca-
demic papers on this subject in peer reviewed publications.
Moreover, coopetition research has moved beyond the
realm of SM and has been applied by researchers to dis-
courses in diplomacy (Alber et al. 2006), civics (Racine
2003), and political science (Fleisher 2001).
3 Modeling Strategic Competition Caused by Resource
Contentions
Before we consider how coopetition can be approached
through modeling, we first consider how competition might
be modeled and analyzed. Several theories have been
proposed to explain the nature and characteristics of
strategic competition between enterprises. These include
Industrial Organization, Chamberlinian, and Schumpete-
rian explanations that refer to different core concepts and
units of analysis (Barney 1986). For example, Henderson
(1983) claims that ‘‘there is no reason to think of business
competitive systems as different in any fundamental way
from other biological competition’’. This view posits that
much like biological competition (between organisms)
economic competition (between enterprises) occurs due to
contention over resources (Henderson 1981). Indeed, this
view is in line with a functional definition of economics as
the ‘‘study of the allocation of ‘scarce’ resources among
competing ends’’ (Chiswick 2009). This means that some
facets of inter-organizational relationships, that are rele-
vant for modeling strategic competition, include actors,
goals, and resources.
In this paper, we adopt i* (distributed intentionality) to
model competition caused by contention over resources.
We acknowledge that modeling strategic competition
caused by other reasons may require other approaches to
modeling. We use i* because it incorporates assumptions
about the real-world properties of actors that are relevant
for understanding contention and rivalry. These properties
include intentionality, autonomy, sociality, contingency (of
identity/boundary), reflectivity, and rationality (in seeking
self-interest) (Yu 2001). Each of these properties explain
different facets of competitive motives of actors and can be
used to understand ‘why’ and ‘how’ actors compete. Due to
these reasons, i* has been applied, in the peer-reviewed
1 Select literature reviews that appeared in peer-reviewed publica-
tions include: (Walley 2007), (Czakon et al. 2014), (Gast et al. 2015),
(Bouncken et al. 2015), (Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 2016), and (Dorn
et al. 2016).
2 Select special editions of scholarly journals include: (Dagnino (ed.)
2007), (Baglieri et al. (eds.) 2008), and (Roy and Czakon (eds.) 2016).
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literature, to represent competitive strategies of organiza-
tions (Carvallo and Franch 2012; Samavi et al. 2008).
i* supports two types of models which are Strategic
Rationale (SR) and Strategic Dependency (SD) diagrams.
SR diagrams support the representation of internal inten-
tional structures of actors while SD diagrams support the
depiction of intentional relationships between actors
through their dependencies. Through SR and SD diagrams,
i* offers reasoning support for analyzing the internal
intentions (Subramanian et al. 2015), goals (Kethers et al.
2005), and strategies (Bencomo et al. 2012) of actors. See
Yu (1997) for a detailed description of i*.
Figure 1 presents an i* SR (Strategic Rationale) diagram
of competition between enterprises that is caused by
common types of resource contentions. Consider the rela-
tionship between two firms, A and B, that are represented
as actors. These actors are in the same industry such that
their products/services are substitutes that serve similar
customer needs. These actors require similar assets (capital
and employees) and consume similar raw materials (in-
gredients and supplies). These assets and raw materials are
represented as resources, which can be used to refer to
physical or informational entities that are required to
achieve some goal or perform some task. These focal
actors, apply these resources to achieve certain subjective
and qualitative goals such as producing a good or selling a
good. Such objectives can be depicted as softgoals which
refer to goals without well-defined criteria for satisfaction
and which requires further refinement and elaboration for
assessing achievement.
The objectives of these actors, such as procuring raw
material or recruiting an employee, are depicted as goals. A
goal refers to an end, objective, aim, or target that reflects a
state of affairs to be achieved. The way by which an actor
can achieve its goal is represented as a task which refers to
an alternative mean for satisfying some goal. These actors
interact with each other in two arenas which are factor and
output markets wherein a factor market is comprised of
investors, suppliers, and job agencies while an output
market is comprised of customers, and an intellectual
property office (e.g., authority that issues patent). Each of
these stakeholders are also depicted as actors and the
resources over which they have control are inscribed within
them.
In i*, an actor (the depender) depends upon another
actor (the dependee) for something (the dependum). For
example, in Fig. 1, Firm A (depender) depends on a cus-
tomer (dependee 1) for an order (dependum 1). It also
depends on an investor (dependee 2) for capital (dependum
2). A depender benefits through its collaboration with a
dependee because it can seize opportunities to satisfy
objectives that it cannot fulfill alone. However, actors in i*
are autonomous and make self-interested decisions. Thus, a
dependency also makes a depender vulnerable because a
dependee may choose to deny a dependum at its sole
discretion.
In i*, the main links are contribution, dependency,
means-ends, and decomposition. Contribution links are
used to depict the impact of one element on another. The
impact upon an element can be positive, negative, or
unknown. For example, hiring a worker helps a firm to
produce a good and selling a good helps a firm to earn
revenue. Dependency links are used to express the rela-
tionship between dependers (those who depend) and
dependees (those who are depended upon) via dependums
(the subjects of the dependencies). For example, to get
capital a firm depends on an investor for funding and to
register a patent a firm depends on an intellectual property
office to enroll its idea. Means-Ends links are the links
between a goal and the alternative tasks for achieving it
such that the completion of any task leads to the satisfac-
tion of its associated goal. Decomposition links are the
links between an element and its sub-elements such that the
achievement of all sub-elements is necessary for the sat-
isfaction of their associated element.
Each firm depends on these stakeholders for different
reasons. An investor offers funds to firms (shown) in return
for principal ? interest and/or profits (not shown). A sup-
plier sells raw materials to firms (shown) in return for
principal ? interest and/or profits (not shown). A job
agency helps a firm to recruit employees (shown) in return
for a charge (not shown). The Intellectual Property Office
issues patents (not shown) after a firm attempt to register its
design (shown). A customer offers its business to firms via
orders (shown) and in return pays the firm for its products
(not shown). It should be noted that, only certain depen-
dencies are show in Fig. 1 to simplify the visual presen-
tation of the diagram. This is not deleterious for the type of
analysis that this model is intended to facilitate because the
shown dependencies are sufficient for the purposes of
demonstrating the presence or absence of strategic com-
petition between different actors.
The ability to represent the heterogeneous facets of
resources is relevant for the modeling and analysis of
strategic competition between enterprises. This is because
Barney (1991) argues that a resource that is valuable, rare,
inimitable, and non-substitutable serves as a source of
competitive advantage for its owner/controller. A resource
is considered valuable if it can be used to generate value,
benefit, or utility for its owner/controller. Moreover, it is
considered to be even more valuable if rivals cannot:
obtain/access it (i.e., rare), mimic/copy it (i.e., inimitable),
or generate comparable value, benefit, or utility from
alternative/replacement resources (i.e., non-substitutable).
Barney (2001) further notes that ‘‘it is almost as though
once a firm becomes aware of the valuable, rare, costly to
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Fig. 1 i* SR diagram of competition from common types of resource contentions among enterprises
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imitate, and nonsubstitutable resources it controls, the
actions the firm should take to exploit these resources will
be self-evident.’’
We slightly extend i* for representing VRIN (Valuable,
Rare, Inimitable, and Non-substitutable) resources as such
resources can lead to resource contentions between actors.
Resource contention is a context dependent occurence that
can potentially deny a dependum if another dependum also
relies on the same VRIN resource and only one of the
contentious dependums can be satisfied. We denote VRIN
as a property of a resource because a resource will only be
VRIN from the perspective of certain actors that depend
upon it. For example, two small retailers may be competing
for the last vacant storefront within the only mall in their
local area such as a town. For each of these retailers that
storefront is VRIN because neither of them have the option
of renting a storefront at a different mall in another town
for logistical reasons. However, this storefront is not VRIN
for two rival multinational retailers as they can simply rent
a storefront at a mall in another town if they are unable to
rent this specific storefront.
The star symbol atop a resource element represents a
VRIN resource while question mark symbols signify con-
tentious dependums whereby the satisfaction of one
dependum denies other corresponding dependums. This
symbol should be interpreted in the following manner: a
resource is VRIN therefore it will be the subject of con-
tention and therefore only one of the contesting dependums
will be satisfied. As it is not known a priori which of the
contesting dependums will be satisfied therefore the satis-
faction or denial of each contesting dependum will be
marked as Unknown. This symbol helps to differentiate
VRIN resources from non-VRIN resources. This is
important because the same resource can be the subject of
multiple dependencies in such a way that each of those
dependums are satisfied (i.e., the resource is not VRIN) or
that only one of those dependums are satisfied while the
other are denied.
There are two main types of relationships that can take
place between two enterprises such as firms A and B. These
are depicted in Fig. 2 which is an i* Strategic Rationale
(SR) diagram of abstract resource contentions between
enterprises. Figure 2 decontextualizes the scenarios that are
presented in Fig. 1 to isolate the strategic patterns that
undergird competitive relationships. This distillation
through abstraction allows for easier detection of compet-
itive configurations in models with details that are specific
to a domain and relevant to a context. i* models can be
used ex ante to design strategies for increasing or
decreasing competition and they can also be used ex post to
identify contentions along with their sources and causes.
In the first type of relationship, an enterprise (e.g., Firm
A) depends on a resource (i.e., Resource X) while another
enterprise (e.g., Firm B) depends on a different resource
(i.e., Resource Z). In this case, there is no competition
between these enterprises as they depend on, and are
interested in, different resources. In the second type of
relationship, two enterprises (e.g., Firm A and Firm B)
depend on the same resource (i.e., Resource Y). In this
case, there is contention between these enterprises as they
depend on, and are interested in, the same resource. This
scenario is likely to lead to strategic competition because
only one of these firms will be able to satisfy its resource
dependency (means) that is necessary for achieving its goal
(ends).
4 Requirements for Modeling Inter-organizational
Coopetition
4.1 Tensions in Paradoxical Relationships
Competition and cooperation are diametric social behav-
iors that are undergirded by opposite logics and assump-
tions (Bengtsson and Kock 2000). Their co-occurrence in
any relationship represents a paradox that creates tensions
Firm A
Resource 
X
Resource 
Owner/
Controller
Enterprise 
Objecve
Access/Obtain 
Resource
Get 
[Resource]
Resource 
Z
Get 
[Resource]
Resource 
Y
Firm B
Enterprise 
Objecve
Access/Obtain 
Resource
Get 
[Resource]
Get 
[Resource]
? ?
Fig. 2 i* SR diagram of competition depicting abstract resource contentions among enterprises
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between the coopeting actors (Raza-Ullah et al. 2014).
Different degrees of cooperation and competition can co-
exist (Bengtsson et al. 2010; Bengtsson and Kock 2000)
within vertical (i.e., buyer–supplier) as well as horizontal
(i.e., firm-to-firm) relationships (Dowling et al. 1996).
Moreover, coopetition can occur within a dyad (i.e.,
between two actors) or in a network (Czakon et al. 2014).
Dyadic coopetition necessitates direct coopetition between
two actors but network coopetition enables direct as well as
indirect coopetition (i.e., via an intermediary). Dyadic
coopetition can be regarded as procedural coopetition
(Rusko 2012) where activity is an appropriate unit of
analysis while network coopetition can be regarded as
contextual coopetition (Rusko 2014) where actor is a
suitable unit of analysis. Coopetition is also a multilevel
phenomenon wherein an actor may exhibit different
behaviors at different levels (i.e., within a dyad or network)
(Chiambaretto and Dumez 2016).
4.2 Key Features of Inter-organizational Coopetitive
Relationships
Researchers have identified various characteristics that
define coopetitive relationships (Gnyawali and Park 2009;
Zineldin 2004; Chin et al. 2008; Bonel et al. 2008;
Bengtsson et al. 2010). These include complementarity
(Tee and Gawer 2009), interdependence (Luo 2005),
trustworthiness (Bouncken and Fredrich 2012), and
reciprocity (Rossi and Warglien 2000). Moreover, it should
be noted that cooperation and competition are germane to
coopetition because coopetition represents the coaction of
these phenomena. In this paper, we include the modeling of
strategic competition (in Sect. 3) as well as inter-
organizational coopetition (in Sect. 5) but omit the mod-
eling of cooperation between enterprises due to space
constraints.
Table 1 presents a list of requirements that are relevant
for modeling coopetition phenomenon. Requirements in
Table 1 were derived intuitively based on a comprehensive
review of literature on inter-organizational coopetition.
Prior experiences of the authors in enterprise modeling
informed the selection of these characteristics and features.
Table 2 presents an assessment of various techniques in
terms of requirements for representing coopetition at the
enterprise-level. The selection of the techniques as well as
their evaluation in Table 2 reflects a subjective and quali-
tative evaluation on the part of the authors. More thorough
selection and evaluation of these techniques is identified as
an area for future work. The techniques in Table 2 were
selected because they were found to have been frequently
applied, in the scholarly literature or practitioner press, to
represent organizational strategy. We acknowledge that
these are not the only techniques that can be used to model
organizational strategy and other modelers can use these
techniques in diverse ways to obtain different evaluation
results.
It should be noted that this assessment does not consider
the syntax and semantics of extensions, derivatives, or
combinations of the reviewed techniques. Prominent goal-
and/or actor-modeling approaches such as NFR frame-
work, KAOS, and i* support the representation of some,
but not all, of these requirements. Similarly, practitioner
tools such as Business Model Canvas and Value Network
Analysis are also deficient with respect to some of these
requirements. Nonetheless, these approaches can be
extended and combined in creative ways to overcome their
Table 1 List of requirements for modeling enterprise coopetition
Characteristics Features Key Description for modeling support
Actor 2 actors or dyad A1 Two actors with links between them
[ 2 actors or network A2 More than two actors with links between them
Actor intention A3 Internal intentional structure of actor(s)
Complementarity Resource/asset/object C1 Entity associated with some value, benefit, or utility
Value added C2 Incremental addition of some value, benefit, or utility
Added value C3 Worth of an actor in terms of value, benefit, or utility
Interdependence Positive dependency I1 Existence of dependency(ies) between actors
Negative dependency I2 Non-existence of any dependency between actors
Strength of dependency I3 Magnitude of dependency (however measured)
Trustworthiness Goal convergence T1 Agreements between goals within and across actors
Goal divergence T2 Conflict between goals within and across actors
Compliance T3 Evaluation of abidance with terms and conditions
Reciprocity Activity or task R1 Individual (step) or collection (process) of actions
Sequence R2 Transition from predecessor to successor action
Condition R3 Constraints or restrictions on actions
123
V. Pant, E. Yu: Modeling Simultaneous Cooperation and Competition..., Bus Inf Syst Eng 60(1):39–54 (2018) 45
respective limitations for modeling and analyzing coope-
tition. This section discusses the key characteristics of
coopetition that are essential for representing it.
4.2.1 Complementarity
According to Tee and Gawer (2009),’’complementarity
refers to the combined returns from the combination of two
or more assets, with some combinations resulting in higher
value creation than other combinations.’’ It is informally
referred to as synergy wherein: ‘the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts’. Complementarity motivates cooper-
ation within competitive relationships and competition
within cooperative relationships. Researchers have identi-
fied various ways through which firms can develop com-
plementarities with their partners. These include overlap
avoidance (Khamseh and Jolly 2014), knowledge protec-
tion (Haeussler et al. 2012), and development of common
objectives (Martinelli and Sparks 2003). Gnyawali and
Park (2011) note that multifaceted dealings between Sony
and Samsung illustrate a coopetitive relationship that is
based on complementary R&D and manufacturing skills.
4.2.2 Interdependence
Luo (2005) states that, ‘‘strategic interdependence is con-
cerned with the extent to which work processes that have
strategic implications are interrelated.’’ Firms are typically
incentivized to become mutually reliant when they have
‘‘partially congruent interest structures’’ (Castaldo and
Dagnino 2009). Interdependence fosters coopetition
because it ensures that ‘‘each competitor will have a
specific individual interest in carrying out an agreement’’
(Garraffo and Rocco 2009). Researchers have identified
various ways through which firms can become more
interdependent with each other. These include investing in
relationship-specific assets (Pache´ and Medina 2007),
interconnecting resources (Wieland and Wallenburg 2013),
and knowledge sharing (Baumard 2009). Bengtsson and
Kock (2000) observed such coopetitive relationships
between many European firms in the rack and pinion as
well as lining industries.
4.2.3 Trustworthiness
According to Hutchinson et al. (2012), ‘‘trust refers to the
expectation that another business can be relied on to fulfill
its obligations.’’ It ‘‘is expected to reduce the level of
potential and actual opportunism’’ (Judge and Dooley
2006) through ‘‘(a) impartiality in negotiations, (b) trust-
worthiness, and (c) keeping of promises’’ (Bouncken and
Fredrich 2012). Moreover, ‘‘while trust is an attribute of a
relationship between exchange partners, trustworthiness is
an attribute of individual exchange partners’’ (Barney and
Hansen 1994). Trustworthiness is an important considera-
tion in coopetition because trust and contracts serve as
governance mechanisms in cooperative relationships.
Researchers have identified various techniques through
which firms can grow their trustworthiness. These include
increasing communication (Zach 2013), avoiding coercion
(Jain et al. 2014), and increasing linkages (Park et al.
2014). Fernandez et al. (2014) identified trust as a ‘‘key
Table 2 Assessment of modeling support for requirements from Table 1
Technique A1 A2 A3 C1 C2 C3 I1 I2 I3 T1 T2 T3 R1 R2 R3
NFR Framework (Chung et al. 2000)
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4 4
9
4
9 9
i* (Yu 1997) 4 4 4 4
9 9
4
9 9
4 4
9
4
9 9
KAOS (Dardenne et al. 1993) 4 4
9
4
9 9 9 9 9 9
4
9
4 4 4
e3Value (Gordijn et al. 2006b) 4 4
9
4 4
9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4 4
9
Business Model Canvas (Osterwalder and Pigneur 2010)
9 9 9
4 4
9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4
9 9
Value Network Analysis (Allee 2008) 4 4
9
4
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Game Tree (Dixit and Nalebuff 2008) 4
9 9 9
4
9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4 4
9
Payoff Table (Dixit and Nalebuff 2008) 4
9 9 9
4
9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4
9 9
Change Matrix (Brynjolfsson et al. 1997) 4
9 9 9
4
9 9 9 9 9 9 9
4
9 9
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factor for success of co-opetitive strategies’’ through an
empirical study of the telecommunications satellite indus-
try in Europe.
4.2.4 Reciprocity
Ashraf et al. (2006) define reciprocity as,’’rewarding
kindness with kindness and punishing unkindness with
unkindness.’’ Sobel (2005) notes that a social actor should
‘‘expect this behavior from others’’ because ‘‘reciprocity is
a rather stable behavioral response by a nonnegligible
fraction of the people’’ (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000). Lee et al.
(2010) point out ‘‘reciprocity has been studied in depth in
economics and game theory as a means to enforce coop-
erative behavior’’. As such, it is commonly used in game
theory to explain social behavior in sequential move games
such as ultimatum game and gift-exchange game (Falk and
Fischbacher 2006). In fact, such behavior is not limited to
games and has been observed in the industry by Kra¨mer
et al. (2016).
5 Example: Inter-partner Learning and Knowledge-
sharing Among Enterprises
Organizations set up strategic alliances to exchange com-
plementary knowledge with their trusted partners (Jiang
and Li 2009; Todeva and Knoke 2005). However, knowl-
edge sharing among partners is not always a reciprocally
beneficial activity. This is because partners can engage in
‘learning races’ (Kale et al. 2000; Khanna et al. 1998)
where each firm tries to ‘learn faster’ than its partners
(Carayannis et al. 2000; Petts 1997). This might be moti-
vated by opportunism such as a firm’s desire for ‘knowl-
edge expropriation’ (Heiman and Nickerson 2004; Ritala
et al. 2015; Sampson 2004; Trkman and Desouza 2012).
Such strategic relationships between enterprises necessitate
the ability to model and analyze complementarity, inter-
dependence, trustworthiness, and reciprocity.
Figure 3 shows the strategic dynamics between two
enterprises (i.e., Firm A and Firm B) that possess com-
plementary knowledge. This means that each possesses a
stock of information that is of use to the other and hence
these firms are interdependent on each other. Information
stock is a resource that allows each firm to make decisions
regarding several business activities. These decisions
include, but are not limited to, those about entering new
markets, designing new products, developing new business
processes, building new organizational structures, and
creating new business relationships.
Each firm identifies learning opportunities from its
partner by evaluating the usefulness of the information
stock of its partner for its own business requirements. After
identifying learning opportunities, a firm tries to access
information from the information stock of its partner to add
it to its own information stock. However, to access infor-
mation from its partner a firm should disclose information
from its own information stock. This is necessary because
both firms must act on complementary learning opportuni-
ties for information exchange to be reciprocally beneficial.
A firm can exchange information with its partner
through two main methods which are accessing and dis-
closing information. Accessing and disclosing information
are two components of the same process because accessing
information depends on the ability of a firm to get infor-
mation from a dependee (i.e., someone that is depended
upon) as well as the ability of the dependee to give infor-
mation to the depender (i.e., someone that is depending).
Likewise, disclosing information depends on the ability of
a firm to give information to a depender as well as the
ability of the depender to get information from the
dependee. Disclosing information requires the presence of
trust because distrust and mistrust can expose partners to
possible exploitation.
In such inter-partner learning arrangements, each firm
must disclose its information stock to its partner to access
the information stock of its partner in return. Learning
ability is a socio-technical resource that enables activities
related to the acquisition, assimilation, absorption, and
application of organizational knowledge. This resource
allows a firm to learn from its partners and makes it pos-
sible for a firm to learn faster than its partner (i.e., allows it
to get more information than it gives). The ability to learn
faster than a partner is advantageous for a firm because it
allows that firm to achieve a higher return from the sharing
of its knowledge. Indeed, Jashapara (2003) argues that
superior organizational learning leads to improved orga-
nizational performance and that ‘‘the only source of sus-
tainable competitive advantage for a company may lie in
its ability to learn faster than its competitors’’ (Jashapara
1993).
A superior learning ability also functions as de facto
insurance policy in a relationship where the partners are
interdependent on each other. This is because it precludes a
partner from being shut out from the information stock of
its partner before it has had a chance to access all the
information that it is seeking from that partner. Conversely,
a firm that can learn faster than its partner can access all the
relevant information from the information stock of its
partner first and then terminate the knowledge sharing
arrangement before that partner has had an opportunity to
learn all the relevant information from its information
stock. Therefore, firms evaluate the trustworthiness of
partners to minimize the risk of exploitation through
opportunism (e.g., knowledge expropriation) in knowl-
edge-sharing scenarios.
123
V. Pant, E. Yu: Modeling Simultaneous Cooperation and Competition..., Bus Inf Syst Eng 60(1):39–54 (2018) 47
Firm A
Share 
Informaon
Moneze 
Informaon
Design New 
Products
Enter New 
Markets
Develop New 
Processes
Build New 
Structures
Create New 
Relaonships Access Informaon
Disclose 
Informaon
Stock of Useful 
Informaon 
Trustworthiness
Grow Stock of 
Useful 
Informaon 
Protect 
Informaon
Get More Than 
Give
Learning 
Ability
Partner
Firm B Firm A Firm B
Get Informaon 
[Useful for Firm A]
Be Trustworthy 
[Firm B]
Be Useful
[Informaon for Firm A]
Be Trustworthy 
[Firm A]
Be Useful
[Informaon from Firm B]
Give Informaon
[Useful for Firm B]
Give Informaon
[Useful for Firm A]
Get Informaon
[Useful for Firm B]
Share 
Informaon
Moneze 
Informaon
Design New 
Products
Enter New 
Markets
Develop New 
Processes
Build New 
Structures
Create New 
Relaonships Access Informaon
Disclose 
Informaon
Stock of Useful 
Informaon 
Trustworthiness
Grow Stock of 
Useful 
Informaon 
Protect 
Informaon
Get More Than 
Give
Learning 
Ability
Partner
Get Informaon 
[Useful for Firm A]
Be Trustworthy 
[Firm B]
Be Useful
[Informaon for Firm A]
Be Trustworthy 
[Firm A]
Be Useful
[Informaon from Firm B]
Give Informaon
[Useful for Firm B]
Give Informaon
[Useful for Firm A]
Get Informaon
[Useful for Firm B]
Share 
Informaon
Moneze 
Informaon
Design New 
Products
Enter New 
Markets
Develop New 
Processes
Build New 
Structures
Create New 
Relaonships Access Informaon
Disclose 
Informaon
Stock of Useful 
Informaon 
Trustworthiness
Grow Stock of 
Useful 
Informaon 
Protect 
Informaon
Get More Than 
Give
Learning 
Ability
Partner
Get Informaon 
[Useful for Firm A]
Be Trustworthy 
[Firm B]
Be Useful
[Informaon for Firm A]
Be Trustworthy 
[Firm A]
Be Useful
[Informaon from Firm B]
Give Informaon
[Useful for Firm B]
Give Informaon
[Useful for Firm A]
Get Informaon
[Useful for Firm B]
A:
A:
A:
A:
A:A:
A:
B:
B:
B:
B:
B:
B:
A:
A:
A:
A:
A:
A:A:
B:
B:
B:
B: B:
B:



Firm A Firm B
Firm A Firm B
Firm A Firm B
Firm A Firm B
A:
B:
A:
B:
A:
B:
A:
B:
A:
B:
A:
B:
A:
B:
Scenario 3: Knowledge exchange breakdown when one-sided opportunism detected
Scenario 2: Knowledge expropriaon with undetected one-sided opportunism
Scenario 1: Knowledge sharing based on bilateral goodwill
Fig. 3.i.a. Fig. 3.i.b.
Fig. 3.ii.a. Fig. 3.ii.b.
Fig. 3.iii.a. Fig. 3.iii.b.
Fig. 3 i* strategic dependency and strategic rationale diagrams of inter-partner learning and knowledge sharing
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There are three main types of relationships that can take
place between two enterprises (e.g., firms A and B) for
inter-partner learning. These are knowledge sharing based
on bilateral goodwill, knowledge expropriation with
undetected one-sided opportunism, and knowledge
exchange breakdown when one-sided opportunism detec-
ted. These are depicted as three pairs of i* Strategic
Rationale (SR) and i* Strategic Dependency (SD) dia-
grams. Figures 3.i.a., 3.ii.a, and 3.iii.a are i* SR diagrams
while Fig. 3.i.b., 3.ii.b., and 3.iii.b are their corresponding
i* SD diagrams. In each i* SR diagram the softgoal ‘‘Get
More Than Give’’ is positioned at the top to indicate that it
is root goal that guides behavior of the actors. An actor
decides whether it wishes to satisfy this softgoal first and
then chooses tasks that increase its likelihood of achieving
that outcome. That actor attempts to satisfy other softgoals
for satisfying or denying the softgoal labeled ‘‘Get More
Than Give’’. Thus, the analysis of these scenarios com-
mences with whether an actor wishes to satisfy or deny this
softgoal.
An example of the importance of a decision regarding
the softgoal ‘‘Get More Than Give’’ is found by evaluating
the outcomes of the softgoal ‘‘Grow Stock of Useful
Information’’. We have modeled growing stock of useful
information as a softgoal because whether a unit of infor-
mation is considered to be useful for a firm depends on the
analyst evaluating that unit of information. Firm A may
give information to a Firm B that technically grows the
information stock of Firm B however that information may
or may not be useful for Firm A. Some analysts may
determine that information from Firm B to be useful for
Firm A whilst other may deem it to be useless. Thus,
‘‘Grow Stock of Useful Information’’ is represented as a
softgoal as the usefulness of a unit of information depends
on the intended user of that unit of information as well as
the analyst evaluating usefulness for that user.
In each of the three scenarios the outcomes of the
softgoal labeled ‘‘Grow Stock of Useful Information’’ for
firms A and B depend upon their choices and those of their
partners regarding the softgoal labeled ‘‘Get More Than
Give’’. In the first scenario, represented in Fig. 3.i.a. nei-
ther of the firms attempt to deny their respective softgoals
labeled ‘‘Get More Than Give’’ and thus each of their
respective softgoals labeled ‘‘Grow Stock of Useful
Information’’ are satisfied. In Fig. 3.iii.a. both of the firms
attempt to satisfy their respective softgoals labeled ‘‘Get
More Than Give’’ and thus their respective softgoals
labeled ‘‘Grow Stock of Useful Information’’ are denied. In
Fig. 3ii.a firm A attempts to satisfy its softgoal labeled
‘‘Get More Than Give’’ while firm B intentionally avoids a
softgoal labeled ‘‘Get More Than Give’’ which leads to the
softgoal labeled ‘‘Grow Stock of Useful Information’’ to be
satisfied for firm A but to be denied for firm B. These
outcomes are different because the softgoal ‘‘Get More
Than Give’’ helps to achieve the softgoal ‘‘Grow Stock of
Useful Information’’. The labels in Fig. 3 are propagated
manually for the softgoal labeled ‘‘Get More Than Give’’
as that is a decision that will be undertaken by the focal
actors. The remaining labels are propagated based on the
contribution links from the softgoal labeled ‘‘Get More
Than Give’’ to the model elements associated with those
outcome labels.
Scenario 1 in Fig. 3 depicts a situation in which both
partners perceive the knowledge exchange to be
equitable as well as fair and therefore they will continue to
cooperate by sharing complementary knowledge. This
might happen if both partners have foregone opportunism
in their past dealings and have built up a reservoir of trust
through acts of reciprocal goodwill. In contrast, scenario 2
in Fig. 3 depicts a situation in which neither partner per-
ceives the knowledge exchange to be equitable or fair and
therefore they will conflict and compete. This might hap-
pen if either partner detects the other party to be engaged in
opportunistic behavior and will lead to retaliation which
will impair the interdependence between the partners.
Scenario 2 in Fig. 3 depicts a situation in which a
partner (i.e., Firm B) has not detected the opportunistic
behavior of its partner (i.e., Firm A). In such a situation,
Firm B continues to grant unrestricted access to its infor-
mation stock to Firm A while Firm A only grants partial
access to its information stock to Firm B. In such a case,
there is simultaneous competition and cooperation between
the actors because both actors are cooperating with each
other, albeit to different extents. While one firm is coop-
erating fully (i.e., Firm B) the other firm (i.e., Firm A) is
cooperating partially because it is also attempting to learn
faster than its partner (i.e., it is competing).
Analysis of the three scenarios in Fig. 3 lead to the
following insights about coopetition in inter-partner
learning and knowledge sharing scenarios:
• Knowledge sharing based on trust and reciprocity can
lead to a stable mutually beneficial equilibrium state.
• Knowledge exchange based on trust from one partner
but opportunistic behavior from the other partner can
only lead to a stable equilibrium if the exploitative
behavior is not detected. It can also lead to a
disequilibrium state if the invidious purports of the
maleficent actor are detected by the well-behaving
partner.
• Knowledge expropriation based on unilateral oppor-
tunistic and exploitative behavior can lead to a
stable mutually harmful equilibrium state when
detected and can damage interdependence between
the partners.
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6 Discussion
Based on our preliminary study, we discuss the suitability
of i* for modeling coopetition. The following limitations
and inadequacies of i* impeded our attempts to fully
express coopetition. These obstacles to comprehensive
expression of coopetition include:
• Temporal support – i* does not support the concept of
absolute or relative time. In coopetitive relationships
the history of moves and countermoves by firms from
an earlier time can have an impact on the space of
available alternatives for firms at a later time. Modeling
this kind of path dependency requires a modeler to
show time as well as sequence in the i* model. For
example, we were not able to show sequence or history
in the same model and had to make multiple models to
represent three scenarios in Fig. 3. Thus, extension of
i* with temporal support will improve its expressive-
ness vis-a`-vis coopetition modeling. We acknowledge
that Tropos which, extends i*, offers real-time linear
temporal reasoning support (Castro et al. 2002).
• Quantitative reasoning – While elements in i* can be
parameterized with numerical values, i* does not
natively support quantitative reasoning. In coopetitive
relationships, comparison of alternatives may be pred-
icated upon considerations of economic impact or
business value which will necessitate quantitative
reasoning. For example, we were not able to model
financial or economic impacts in numerical terms in our
models and thus had to omit these aspects from our
models. Therefore, extension of i* to support quanti-
tative reasoning will increase its expressiveness with
respect to modeling of coopetition. We acknowledge
that Goal-oriented requirements language (GRL),
which is a derivative of i*, supports certain types of
quantitative reasoning (Mussbacher 2007).
• Conditional logic – While dependencies and contribu-
tion links can be used to infer some type of condition-
ality indirectly, i* does not support the depiction of
conditionality directly. In coopetitive relationships
certain alternatives may or may not be available if
other alternatives are satisfied or denied. It is not
possible to show relationships of inclusivity or exclu-
sivity in i* and therefore extension of i* with support
for representation of conditionality will improve its
expressiveness with respect to modeling coopetition.
For example, we were not able to clearly show
sequences in our models and had to explain this via
accompanying text. We acknowledge that some
researchers have combined i* with BPMN for depicting
conditionality in process flows (Koliadis et al. 2006).
• Visual scalability – In spatial terms, i* models can
become quite large and dense if they contain a large
number of highly interrelated elements. In coopetitive
scenarios, multiple firms may compete and cooperate
with other in a myriad of ways. Showing all the
relevant actors and their internal intentional elements as
well as their external dependencies might yield a model
that occupies a large amount of space and is difficult for
a human analyst to grasp. For example, we found
contribution links and dependency lines were difficult
to configure in ways that avoided overlapping and
curving.
• Semantic complexity – A generalized socio-technical
ontology serves as the foundation of the i* framework.
This allows modelers to analyze i* models in a
consistent and coherent manner. This ontology specifies
the manner in which elements should be added to
models and their relationships must be depicted using
prescribed guidelines. These requirements can confuse
some novice i* modelers and might increase their
learning curve. For example, we did not need to use
many of the i* constructs in our models. Ongoing
attempts to simplify the semantics and notation of i*
are steps in the right direction.
On the positive side, we were able to use i* to model:
relationships rather than transactions (e.g., we were able to
show dependencies moderated by trust), link between a
cause (e.g., opportunism) and its consequences (e.g.,
retaliation), abstract patterns and decontextualized repre-
sentations of phenomena with many variants (e.g., resource
contentions), trade offs between alternative courses of
action (e.g., act opportunistically or responsibly), and, with
a slight extension to i*, context dependency of an element
(e.g., VRIN property of a resource).
7 Related Work
Currently, there is a dearth of modeling based approaches
for representing and reasoning about interorganizational
coopetition in a structured and systematic manner. Game
theorists have proposed the Value Net approach (Bran-
denburger and Nalebuff 1995, 1996; Nalebuff and Bran-
denburger 1997) for analyzing coopetitive relationships.
However, this approach is suitable for descriptive, but not
explanatory, application because it lacks an ontology as
well as semantic support which makes it vulnerable to
arbitrary usage. Similarly, game theorists have proposed
quantitative tools and techniques such as game trees and
payoff tables (Dixit and Nalebuff 2008) that can be used to
reason about coopetition. However, these techniques are
suitable for evaluating pre-set solutions to predefined
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problems. They are not conducive to generative and
exploratory analysis in which the design space is refined
and elaborated progressively over successive iterations
with new problems and solutions introduced in each round.
Within the field of Enterprise Modeling (EM), several
researchers have explored social behaviors among organi-
zations (Giannoulis et al. 2011a; Liu et al. 2009).
Researchers also have proposed modeling notations and
techniques for expressing and evaluating organizational
strategy, that encompasses such social relationships
(Giannoulis et al. 2011b; Weigand et al. 2007; Gordijn
et al. 2006a; Osterwalder et al. 2005). These modeling
approaches have been developed to describe different
aspects of enterprises (e.g., goal, actor, value, process, etc.)
(Johannesson 2007). Additionally, researchers have applied
many goal- and actor-oriented approaches to model and
analyze business strategies that include these social
behaviors (Lo´pez and Franch 2014; Paja et al. 2016; Car-
vallo and Franch 2012).
However, even though coopetition impacts many of the
enterprise-level entities that are of concern to these
approaches (such as goals, tasks, resources, boundaries,
etc.) – none of these approaches have focused directly on
this counterintuitive social phenomenon. It can be argued
that these gaps ‘‘make it difficult for requirements engineers
to validate low-level requirements against the more abstract
high-level requirements representing the business strategy’’
(Bleistein et al. 2004). This ability to model coopetition
between enterprises is useful for information system
designers as it can inform decisions about transaction pro-
cessing, data sharing, compliance monitoring, and process
integration. Therefore, the ability to model and analyze
cooperation, competition, and coopetition between enter-
prises represents advancement in the state-of-the-art in EM.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper provided an overview of the phenomenon of
coopetition as well as some of its key facets and charac-
teristics that are relevant for enterprise modeling. Coopeti-
tion is widely observed in practice and consequently it is
also an eminent research area (Bouncken et al. 2015).
Baglieri et al. (2012) claim that ‘‘coopetition is common in
several industries’’ and Harbison and Pekar (1998) note that
roughly 50% of strategic alliances are between competitors.
Nonetheless, in spite of its prominence, coopetition has not
been explored in the enterprise modeling literature. We
intend to address this shortcoming by contributing to the
development a modeling framework that is suitable for
analyzing cooperation, competition, and coopetition.
In this paper we proposed models of certain types of
coopetitive relationships. We started with the generic
version of i* but are aware that there are many relevant
extensions of i*. While none of these extensions deal
specifically with coopetition they offer useful lessons or
insights for modeling coopetition (e.g., from security, risk,
and policy/regulatory compliance and enforcement).
Table 1 presents a list of these requirements however it
can benefit from further elaboration and refinement. The
next logical step in this research area is to identify and
catalog the requirements for modeling these phenomena.
After identifying the requirements for modeling coopeti-
tion, a next step can be the assessment of the adequacy of
extant modeling languages for satisfying those require-
ments. Table 2 presents relevant findings however we
invite researchers to improve them through more rigorous
and detailed assay. Moreover, any revisions to Table 1 will
necessarily require Table 2 to be revised as well.
After evaluating modeling languages, from Table 2, in
terms of their sufficiency for satisfying the requirements
from the catalog, in Table 1, a next step will be to address
the shortcomings of those modeling languages. This can be
done by developing a conceptual modeling framework that
extends and combines extant notations and techniques. To
verify this framework, it will be fruitful to share it with
management practitioners. Additionally, it will be beneficial
to collaborate with industry partners to validate this frame-
work in the field. Published and empirical case studies will
be useful for refining and elaborating the artefacts that
emerge from this research project. Case studies, that are
relevant for this research project, will be those that focus on
the coopetitive relationships of an organization. Case studies
will concentrate on the utility of the modeling framework for
analyzing coopetition at focal organizations in contrast to
ad-hoc or unsystematic/unstructured analysis.
This enterprise modeling framework will be purpose built
for depicting the main characteristics that are relevant for
modeling and analyzing abstract patterns and decontextual-
ized representations of coopetition. It will allow the explo-
ration of opportunities for coopetition as well as the
evaluation of strategic alternatives in a structured and sys-
tematic manner. Overall, our eventual objective is to provide
a model-based approach for IS designers and strategists to
understand and analyze the impact of coopetition on IS
design decisions and vice versa. This framework will rep-
resent a contribution towards advancing the state-of-the-art
in enterprise modeling (Pant and Yu 2016).
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